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Abstract
The role of bankruptcy law in credit markets has received renewed attention in the after-
math of the housing bubble collapse. The fundamental challenge for research on this topic is
to separate the impact of legal factors from other features of the credit environment. We do
so by exploiting historical variation in federal judicial rulings regarding whether Chapter 13
bankruptcy ﬁlers could reduce the principal owed on a home loan to the home’s market value.
The practice, known as cramdown, was deﬁnitively prohibited by the Supreme Court in 1993.
We ﬁnd evidence that home loans closed during the time when cramdown was allowed had
interest rates 10-20 basis points higher than loans closed in the same state when cramdown was
not allowed, which translates to a roughly 1-2 percent increase in monthly payments. Consis-
tent with the theory that lenders are pricing in the risk of principal modiﬁcation, interest rate
increases are higher for the riskiest borrowers and zero for the least risky, as well as higher in
states where Chapter 13 ﬁling is more common. Though the price of credit rises slightly, we
ﬁnd no evidence of a change in the quantity of credit provided. The relatively small impacts
of cramdown on the cost of credit suggests that the insurance beneﬁts of bankruptcy may be
relatively inexpensive.
We thank for helpful comments Edward Glaeser, Edward Morrison, and participants at the Conference on Em-
pirical Legal Studies. Institutional support from the Harvard Kennedy School’s Taubman Center for State and Local
Government is gratefully acknowledged. Any errors are our own.1 Introduction
The bursting of the housing bubble has left millions of American homeowners underwater on
their mortgages. Estimates from the last quarter of 2011 suggest that over eleven million house-
holds, or nearly a quarter of mortgagors, are underwater, with many owing more than 150% of
the value of their property.1 The more than $700 billion in negative equity has been cited as a
critical factor contributing to foreclosures, preventing the housing market from clearing, and de-
laying macroeconomic recovery by impeding consumer spending (Mayer et al. 2009, Case et al.
2011, Dynan 2012).
Despite general recognition of the problems created by negative equity, there has been lit-
tle in the way of voluntary principal reduction by lenders or mortgage servicers. The largest
mortgagees in the country, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, prohibit principal reduction outright.
Portfolio lenders are often reluctant to write-down principal because of the loss recognition con-
sequences. Third-party servicers are sometimes contractually prohibited from modiﬁcation and
are often incentivized to foreclose or undertake other types of modiﬁcations (Gelpern and Levitin
2009, Levitin and Twomey 2011). Government action has tried to encourage principal reduction
with limited success. The federal government’s Home Affordable Modiﬁcation Program includes
a Principal Reduction Alternative that pays servicers up to 21 cents for every dollar of mortgage
debt they forgive. The landmark federal-state mortgage servicing fraud settlement announced in
February 2012 calls for at least $10 billion in principal reductions. These developments, however,
have been modest in scale relative to the scope of negative equity nationwide.
During the early years of the housing crisis, recognition of the various frictions that impede
loan modiﬁcation, and in particular principal reduction, led to proposals to permit mortgages to
be modiﬁed in personal bankruptcy proceedings without the consent of the mortgagee (Levitin
2009). Involuntary modiﬁcation of mortgages in bankruptcy was designed to cut through trans-
actional frictions, as well as to encourage voluntary modiﬁcations outside of bankruptcy. These
proposals, known as “cramdown” or “stripdown” would have resulted in the underwater portion
1See the March 1, 2012 press release from CoreLogic entitled, “CoreLogic Reports Negative Equity Increase in
Q4”, available from the authors or at http://www.corelogic.com/about-us/news/asset_upload_file909_
14436.pdf.
1of mortgage loans being treated as unsecured loans in bankruptcy, and therefore dischargeable by
the debtor for pennies on the dollar. The cramdown proposal took the form of highly contentious
legislation that passed the House of Representatives in 2008, but which failed in 2009 to achieve
the requisite 60 votes for cloture in the Senate, despite the endorsement of President Obama.
Opponents of this legislation argued that it would substantially increase the cost of mortgage
credit going forward. The Mortgage Bankers Association, which led the lobbying against the
legislation, contended that cramdown would result in a 150 or 200 basis point increase in the
average cost of mortgages.2 The authors of that study admitted, however, that “The number is
an approximation, as there is no market parallel from which we can make exact comparisons.”
In other words, at that point, no rigorous empirical evidence existed with which to forecast the
impact of cramdown legislation on credit markets.
In this paper, we provide the ﬁrst such evidence, using a natural experiment to test the im-
pact of bankruptcy cramdown on mortgage interest rates. Between 1978 and 1993, a number of
bankruptcy, district and circuit courts throughout the United States issued varying opinions on
the permissibility of mortgage cramdown under federal bankruptcy law. In 1993, the Supreme
Court declared the practice impermissible under the law, citing in part legislative history sug-
gesting concern about the impact of cramdown on the cost of credit. The legal variation between
judicial districts and over time allows us to test cramdown’s impact on mortgage interest rates
and other characteristics using a difference-in-difference strategy.
We ﬁnd evidence that home loans closed during the time when cramdown was allowed had
interest rates 10-20 basis points higher than loans closed in the same state when cramdown was
not allowed, which translates to a roughly 1-2 percent increase in monthly payments. Consistent
with the theory that lenders are pricing in the risk of principal modiﬁcation, interest rate increases
are higher for the riskiest borrowers and zero for the least risky, as well as higher in states where
Chapter 13 ﬁling is more common. Though the price of credit rises slightly, we ﬁnd no evidence
of a change in the quantity of credit provided. The relatively small impacts of cramdown on the
2See the December 16, 2008 letter from the Mortgage Bankers Association to Senator Richard Durbin
available from the authors or at http://www.mortgagebankers.org/files/Advocacy/2008/
MBAAnswersSenatorDurbinsQuestiononBankruptcy.pdf. The MBA’s impact claim and analysis changed
over time (Levitin 2009).
2cost of credit suggests that the insurance beneﬁts of bankruptcy may be relatively inexpensive.
Our paper makes two major contributions. First, it provides the ﬁrst clear empirical evidence
about the impact of cramdown on credit markets. We are aware of nearly no prior research on
this question. Using an equilibrium model of consumer default, Luzzetti and Neumuller (2012)
estimate little or no impact of cramdown on default rates and house prices. They do not, however,
estimate the impact of cramdown on the equilibrium cost of credit, nor is it clear how sensitive
their estimates are to their choices of model parameters. Fitzpatrick IV and Thomson (2010) re-
view evidence from the 1980s farm foreclosure crisis, during which Congress enacted legislation
permitting cramdown for bankruptcy ﬁlers under the newly created Chapter 12. They cite an
earlier survey of a “small group of bankers”, who reported little change in the interest rates they
were granting to farmers. Such self-reporting by a small sample of lenders is not particularly con-
vincing, particularly given the difﬁculty of separating the impact of cramdown from the changing
economic environment at that time. We believe that our paper is thus the ﬁrst to provide well-
identiﬁed estimates of the impact of cramdown on the cost and quantity of credit.
Our second, more general, contribution is to the literature on the impact of bankruptcy law on
creditmarkets, asurprisinglylimitedareagiventhecentralityofcreditavailabilityandcostimpact
claims to policy debates over bankruptcy reform.3 The bulk of this research has focused on the
impactofexemptionsthatprotectpropertyfromcreditorattachment, exploitingvariationbetween
states and over time in the maximum value of such exemptions. These studies reach conﬂicting
conclusions about the impact of higher exemption levels on home, car and small business loans,
with some ﬁnding higher interest rates and lower loan volumes (Gropp et al. 1997, Lin and White
2001, Berkowitz and White 2004) and others ﬁnding no discernible effect (Berkowitz and Hynes
1999, Chomsisengphet and Elul 2006). Relatedly, Pence (2006) ﬁnds lower home loan volumes in
states with judicial foreclosure requirements that substantially slow down the foreclosure process.
Our paper is the ﬁrst to use judicial rulings as a source of exogenous variation in the state of
bankruptcy law and is the ﬁrst to show clear evidence of differential impacts of bankruptcy law
by the risk to the lender of a given loan ending up in bankruptcy.
3We limit our focus here to research that engages seriously with problems of causal inference.
3A brief outline of our papers is as follows. In section 2, we deﬁne cramdown and discuss its
legal history. In sections 3 and 4, we describe the data and empirical strategy at the heart of this
paper. In section 5, we discuss our empirical results. Section 6 concludes with a discussion of the
implications of these results for legal and economic policy.
2 Cramdown
Consumer bankruptcy comes in two main ﬂavors, referred to by their chapter in the United States
Bankruptcy Code: Chapter 7 liquidations and Chapter 13 repayment plans.4 In Chapter 7, the
debtor surrenders all assets, other than a limited subset of statutorily “exempt” assets, for distri-
bution to creditors. This means that in most circumstances a Chapter 7 debtor will not be able to
retain his or her home. In Chapter 13, in contrast, the debtor usually retains all of his property, but
must devote all disposable personal income for the next three or ﬁve years to repaying creditors
under a court-supervised repayment plan and budget. Debtors seeking to retain major property,
such as a residence, typically ﬁle for Chapter 13, although there is signiﬁcant geographical and
racial variation in the propensity to use Chapter 13 (Braucher et al. 2012).
In a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, the debtor proposes a 3-5 year repayment plan that, if it complies
with the relevant statutory requirements, will be conﬁrmed by the court. During the plan period,
creditors may not attempt to collect pre-bankruptcy debts other than through the bankruptcy pro-
cess. If the debtor completes the repayment plan, then the debtor receives a discharge of unpaid
pre-bankruptcydebts. Ifthedebtorfailstocompletetherepaymentplan, however, thebankruptcy
case will be dismissed without a discharge, and creditors may then resume their collection activi-
ties.
Chapter13debtorshaveagreatdealofleewayinstructuringtheirrepaymentplans. AChapter
13 debtor is able to restructure almost all types of debts, with the repayment plan able to specify
changes in interest rates, amortization, and terms of loans. A Chapter 13 repayment plan may also
“cram down” undersecured (or “underwater”) debts, those secured by collateral worth less than
the amount of the debt. Cramdown bifurcates the undersecured creditor’s claim into a secured
4For an overview of bankruptcy law and recent empirical research, see White (2011).
4claim for the value of the collateral and a general unsecured claim for the difference between
the loan amount and the collateral’s value (the “deﬁciency”). This distinction matters because
a Chapter 13 plan must pay a secured creditor the value of its secured claim, while a general
unsecured claim is guaranteed only as much as would be paid out in a Chapter 7 liquidation,
typically very little or nothing (Jimenez 2009). In recent years, general unsecured debt in Chapter
13 cases has traded at about 10-15 cents on the dollar (Levitin 2010). Therefore, from a lender’s
perspective, cramdown is equivalent to a forced principal reduction on the debt to the value of
the collateral, based on a judicial rather than a market valuation. Cramdown is likely to result in
a near complete loss of the underwater portion of the debt if the bankruptcy plan is completed.
While Chapter 13 permits restructuring of almost all types of debts, it explicitly excludes cer-
tain home mortgage loans. The Bankruptcy Code provides that a Chapter 13 repayment plan may
“modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured only by a security inter-
est in real property that is the debtor’s principal residence” (11 U.S.C. x1322(b)(2)). As explicated
in judicial decisions, bankruptcy judges can thus modify loans on vacation homes, investor prop-
erties, multifamily residences in which the owner occupies a unit, and wholly unsecured second
mortgages on their principal residences, as well as loans secured by yachts, jewelry, household
appliances, furniture or vehicles. The Bankruptcy Code thus prevents modiﬁcation only of mort-
gages secured solely by real property that is the debtor’s principal residence. Such mortgage loans
must be cured and then paid off according to their original terms, including all fees that have been
levied since default, or else the bankruptcy automatic stay will be lifted, permitting the mortgagee
to foreclose on the property (Levitin 2009). As a result, if a debtor’s ﬁnancial distress stems from
an unaffordable home mortgage, bankruptcy is unable to help the debtor retain her home, and
foreclosure will occur.
From the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, up until mid-1993, some federal courts
interpreted the Bankruptcy Code as prohibiting mortgage modiﬁcation in general but permitting
cramdown in particular. That is, a loan could not be modiﬁed, but these courts did not see cram-
down as modifying the loan. Instead, they understood cramdown to simply be determining the
classiﬁcation of the loan in bankruptcy, namely that under a generally applicable bankruptcy prin-
5cipal, the amount of the claim classiﬁed as secured was limited to the value of the collateral. In
1993, however, the Supreme Court ruled on the issue in a case called Nobelman v. American Savings
Bank, holding unanimously that cramdown was a form of mortgage modiﬁcation and therefore
prohibited in Chapter 13.
While the Court’s ruling was based on statutory interpretation, rather than policy analysis,
Justice Steven’s concurring opinion emphasized a policy rationale, namely that bankruptcy’s spe-
cial protection for home mortgage lenders is designed to enable lenders to offer lower interest
rates and thus encourages home ownership: “At ﬁrst blush it seems somewhat strange that the
Bankruptcy Code should provide less protection to an individual’s interest in retaining posses-
sion of his or her home than to other assets. The anomaly is, however, explained by the legislative
history indicating that favorable treatment of residential mortgagees was intended to encourage
the ﬂow of capital into the home lending market.”5
The implicit model underlying such logic is that the equilibrium interest rate in the market for
home loans is determined by the expected return to lenders of such loans. This, in turn, consists
of the weighted average of the returns from the loan in various bankruptcy states, where the
weights are the probabilities that a given loan ends up in such a state (Berkowitz and Hynes
1999). Cramdown lowers the expected return from a loan should the borrower end up in Chapter
13. This model thus predicts that permitting cramdown should raise interest rates more for those
at greatest ex ante risk of ﬁling for bankruptcy under Chapter 13. This varies between loans both
because of variation in a borrower’s own credit risk and the geographic variation in the use of
Chapter 13. We exploit both of these aspects of risk in the analysis below.
3 The Data
We collect data for all judicial rulings on the permissibility of cramdown from federal bankruptcy,
district and circuit courts between October 1979, the effective date of the Bankruptcy Code, and
June 1993, the date of the Supreme Court’s decision in Nobelman v. American Savings Bank that
cramdown was not permissible under the Code. During this time period, there were roughly 60
5Nobelman v. American Savings Bank, 508 U.S. 324 (1993).
6such rulings in bankruptcy and district courts and four such rulings in circuit courts. Nearly 40
of those lower court rulings and three of the four circuit court rulings held that cramdown was
permissible.6
We construct a variable called Cramdownsm, which indicates whether cramdown was allowed
by judicial ruling in state s and month m. We assume that prior to any judicial ruling, cramdown
was not allowed, in which case Cramdown has value zero. Cramdown has value one in states
where all lower courts or a circuit court have ruled in favor of cramdown. In states where only
some lower courts have allowed cramdown or where lower courts have conﬂicting rulings, we
assign Cramdown a value equal to the raw average of the permissibility of cramdown across that
state’s lower courts. For example, Cramdown would have a value of 0.5 in state with one lower
court ruling in favor of cramdown and another lower court not having yet ruled on the issue.
Though it might be appropriate to construct an average weighted by size of the housing market,
such data are difﬁcult to obtain at the federal district level. If using a raw average introduces clas-
sical measurement error into our right-hand side variable, our coefﬁcients will be underestimates
of the true effect of allowing cramdown.
We collect bankruptcy ﬁling data from the American Bankruptcy Institute, which publishes
by state and year the number of bankruptcy ﬁlings under each chapter of the Bankruptcy Code.
Our main use of such data is to explore whether judicial rulings on cramdown have a larger effect
on the mortgage market in states where Chapter 13 bankruptcy ﬁlings are more common.7 Using
population statistics from the Statistical Abstract of the United States, we assign to each state a
measure of Chapter 13 intensity as of 1987, prior to the vast majority of cramdown rulings, which
we deﬁne as the number of Chapter 13 ﬁlings per 1,000 residents in the state.
Our primary outcomes of interest are the cost and quantity of credit in the home loan mar-
ket. We use the Federal Housing Finance Agency’s Monthly Interest Rates Survey (MIRS), which
asks mortgage lenders to report the terms on all single-family loans that are closed on the last ﬁve
business days of each month. The survey excludes multifamily loans, mobile home loans, mort-
6A complete list of these rulings is available from the authors upon request.
7We have tried to use this data to estimate the impact of cramdown on bankruptcy ﬁling rates, but the data is
available only at the annual level, preventing us from exploiting the precise timing of the judicial rulings that serve as
our source of variation. The resulting estimates are too noisy to draw any useful conclusions.
7gage reﬁnance loans, loans insured by the Federal Housing Administration and loans guaranteed
by the Veterans Administration. MIRS contains information on each loan’s interest rate, princi-
pal, term, house price, ﬁxed- or adjustable-rate structure, and lender type (savings association,
mortgage company, commercial bank, or savings bank).
Table 1 describes the variables from the merged data set in which we assign to each loan in
MIRS the value of Cramdown in the state and month that the loan was closed. Because the vast
majority of the judicial rulings occurred between 1989 and mid-1993, we limit the sample to loans
closed between January 1987 and December 1996, as shown in the ﬁrst row of the table. The
ﬁnal data set contains over 1.1 million individual loans. The rest of panel (A) shows that, in this
time period, 19% of loans were closed in states and months in which cramdown was allowed by
judicial ruling. Circuit rulings covering multiple states account for 13% of this total while lower
court rulings account for 6% of the total. The ﬁnal row of the panel shows that the average loan
was issued in a state that, in 1987, had a Chapter 13 ﬁling rate of 0.5 per 1,000 residents. This rate
varied widely between states, with a minimum of 0.01 (in Vermont) and a maximum of 2.76 (in
Tennessee).
Panel (B) shows some of the outcomes of interest in this paper, namely the measures of the
quantity and price of credit. The average principal of a loan in the MIRS data over this time period
was $112,000, with an average loan-to-value ratio of 77%.8 The effective interest rate, which is the
stated interest rate on the loan plus the implied interest cost of any fees associated with the loan,
averaged 8.22%.9 Panel (C) shows other characteristics of these loans, including average term
(nearly 28 years), the fraction that have adjustable rates (42%), and the types of lenders (64% are
traditional savings banks and 27% are mortgage companies).
8This measures the ratio of the loan principal to the price of the home.
9We focus on the effective interest rate rather than the stated interest rate because lenders could potentially com-
pensate for cramdown risks by increasing up front fees rather than the interest rate. In practice, the difference between
these two quantities is small, on the order of 20 basis points on average. Our results are unaffected by the choice of
which interest rate measure to use.
84 Empirical Strategy
Figure 1 shows two different measures of the extent to which the various judicial rulings on cram-
down changed the legal environment. The panel (A) shows the fraction of states in a given month
in which at least one judicial decision allowing cramdown was in force. At the start of this time
period, in January 1987, only a handful of states had experienced such rulings. That number rose
relatively slowly until October 1989, when the Ninth Circuit issued a ruling allowing cramdown
in Hougland v. Lomas & Nettleton Co. The fraction of states with such rulings then continued a fairly
steady climb until the issue reached the Supreme Court, which in June 1993 ruled in Nobelman v.
American Savings Bank that the Bankruptcy Code should not be interpreted to allow cramdown
under Chapter 13. That ruling disallowed cramdown in all states. Panel (B) shows the fraction of
loans in our data issued under cramdown-allowing judicial regimes. This panel can be thought
of as a version of panel (A) in which each state is weighted by the number of loans issued in that
state and month. The sharp rise in October 1989 highlights the large fraction of the home loan
market covered by the Ninth Circuit decision, relative to the decisions of smaller jurisdictions at
other times. Figure 1 shows that, by early 1993, judicial rulings allowing cramdown applied to
over 30 states and covered about 60% of the home loans issued in the United States.
Both panels highlight a simple way to think of this natural experiment. At the start of this time
period, cramdown was allowed in very few jurisdictions. Between 1989 and 1993, cramdown
became legal in a large number of jurisdictions. Then, in June 1993, the Supreme Court returned
the US to its prior state, in which cramdown was not allowed anywhere. The natural experiment
is thus driven by the fact that, for a 3-4 year window, cramdown was unexpectedly made legal
in some jurisdictions but not in others. This fact suggests the use of a difference-in-difference
strategy estimating whether the differences in home loan conditions between cramdown-allowing
states and cramdown-forbidding states was different in the period when cramdown was allowed
relative to the periods before and after.
We employ this strategy, but augment it by exploiting a few further facts highlighted in Figure
2. First, as seen in panel (A), states differed not only according to whether cramdown was ever
allowed by judicial ruling but also in the timing of such rulings. Six states had rulings allowing
9cramdown as early as 1987-88, while the remaining states are relatively evenly split between ﬁrst
rulings in 1989-90, ﬁrst rulings in 1991-92, and never having rulings allowing cramdown. This
differential timing provides an additional source of variation that we exploit in our subsequent
regression analysis, allowing us to separate the effect of the judicial rulings from other contempo-
raneous factors affecting the nation as a whole. Panels (B) and (C) highlight two further sources of
heterogeneity we explore. Panel (B) reveals that, in addition to the differential timing of judicial
rulings, the highest level of cramdown ruling also varied by state, with some states subject only
to lower court rulings and other eventually subject to circuit court rulings. Given that lower court
rulings can be overturned by circuit courts, we might expect markets to react more strongly to
circuit court rulings that have a higher likelihood of becoming a permanent feature of the legal
environment. We explore this hypothesis in the subsequent analysis.
We also explore in the subsequent analysis the extent to which the bankruptcy environment
interacts with these judicial rulings. As panel (C) shows, there is geographic variation in the extent
to which residents of a given state ﬁle for bankruptcy under Chapter 13, with such ﬁlings more
common in the South and West. We might expect markets to react more strongly to judicial rulings
allowing cramdown in states where Chapter 13 ﬁlings are more common. In these states, lenders
might expect lower returns on loans because of the higher probability that loans would end up in
Chapter 13 and thus potentially being crammed down.
We thus exploit the facts that states differed both in the extent to which cramdown was ever
allowed and the timing of such rulings. We do so by implementing difference-in-difference re-
gressions of the form:
Ylsm = 0 + 1Cramdownsm + s + m + Xlsm + lsm (1)
Here Y is a characteristic, such as an interest rate or principal amount, of loan l closed in state s
in month m. The variable Cramdown measures the extent to which cramdown is allowed in that
state and month, as deﬁned previously. State ﬁxed effects  control for any differences between
states that are constant across time, such as differing provisions in state bankruptcy laws. Month
ﬁxed effects  control for any differences between months that are constant across states, such as
10shocks to the national economy or interest rate changes by the Federal Reserve. We control in
some speciﬁcations for X, a vector of loan characteristics including the loan’s term, its loan-to-
value ratio, an indicator for adjustable rate, and indicators for each type of lender.
The inclusion of state and month ﬁxed effects means that 1, the coefﬁcient of interest, is identi-
ﬁed by within-state changes in the legal status of cramdown, controlling for monthly nationwide
shocks. This means that the observed correlations between cramdown rulings and loan condi-
tions such as interest rates cannot be caused by differences across states with differing cramdown
rulings or by correlations between the timing of rulings and nationwide shocks.
For certain outcomes, we run versions of the above regression in which we collapse the data
to state-month cells by mean or various percentiles:
Ysm = 0 + 1Cramdownsm + s + m + sm (2)
In all speciﬁcations, the error term  may have an unobserved component correlated within states
acrosstime, soweclusterthestandarderrorsatthestateleveltoaccountforsuchserialcorrelation.
5 Empirical Results
Table 2 shows the mean impact of cramdown rulings on the equilibrium quantity and price of
home loans. Columns (1)-(4) use as outcomes four different measures of the quantity of credit
transacted in a given market. Columns (1) and (2) collapse the data to state-month cells. In column
(1), the outcome is the logarithm of the number of loans closed in a given state and month. In
column (2), the outcome is the logarithm of the total amount of principal loaned in a given state
and month. In panel (A), the point estimates in those two columns suggest that cramdown is
associated with a roughly one percent decrease in the quantity of loans and loaned funds, but
the standard errors render the estimates very imprecise. Columns (3) and (4) use as outcomes
the logarithm of each loan’s principal amount and loan-to-value ratio. The standard errors on
the two coefﬁcients in panel (A) are still too large to reject the hypothesis that loan quantities are
unaffected by the judicial rulings. Overall, these four columns provide little evidence of an impact
11of cramdown rulings on the quantity of loans transacted in these markets.
In columns (5)-(8), we explore the impact of cramdown rulings on the price of credit as mea-
sured by the effective interest rate on these home loans. In column (5), which controls only for
state and month ﬁxed effects, the coefﬁcient implies that the cramdown rulings led to a statisti-
cally signiﬁcant rise in the interest rate of 12 basis points. Column (6) shows that this estimate is
unchanged by the inclusion of state-speciﬁc linear time trends and state-level monthly unemploy-
ment rates, suggesting that cramdown rulings are not more likely in states with a prior interest
rate trajectory nor are correlated in time with local economic conditions. In column (7), the es-
timated impact of allowing cramdown rises slightly to 14 basis points when we control for loan
characteristics such as term, loan-to-value ratio, adjustable rate status, and lender type. Finally,
in column (8), we exclude from the sample the subset of states in which no judicial ruling in this
period ever permitted cramdown, on the theory that such states may differ fundamentally from
states with such rulings and thus might not be ideal controls. This exclusion raises the estimated
impact of allowing cramdown to 16 basis points. These robust results provide clear evidence that
such rulings led to a rise in the cost of credit, on the order of 12-16 basis points.
Panel (B) interacts the cramdown measure with indicators for whether the highest ruling in
a given month came from a circuit court or a lower court. There is no clear evidence in the ﬁrst
four columns of an impact of either type of decision on loan quantities. The last four columns
reveal, however, that the interest rate increase seen in panel (A) is driven entirely by the circuit
court rulings on cramdown, with point estimates on such rulings ranging from 14-19 basis points.
This is consistent with the theory that lenders in a given jurisdiction believe circuit court decisions
to be much better predictors of the actual future state of the law than lower court decisions, which
are overturned with some frequency. In other words, lower court rulings had much less impact
than circuit court rulings on lenders’ beliefs about the expected returns to newly issued loans.
As discussed earlier, cramdown permissibility should theoretically have the largest impact on
loans at greatest risk of default. The MIRS data have no good proxy for risk, such as a credit
score, so we instead explore the impact of cramdown on the full distribution of interest rates
within a state in a given month. We assume that, in a given state and month, the loans with the
12highest interest rates are on average those judged by lenders to be the riskiest. Loans with low
interest rates, conversely, are those made to borrowers with high credit scores and thus little risk
of default. We would therefore expect cramdown permissibility to have relatively small impacts
on loans with low interest rates and relatively big impacts on loans with high interest rates.
Panel (A) of Table 3 conﬁrms this prediction. Here we have collapsed the loan data to state-
month cells, computing the mean and 10th through 90th percentiles of that distribution. We then
run regressions with state and month ﬁxed effects as before, but weight the regressions by the
number of loans in each cell. Column (1) thus replicates our central result from column (5) of
Table 2, showing that the mean impact of cramdown is a 12 basis point rise in interest rates.
The remaining columns show no impact of cramdown on the 10th through 40th percentile of the
interest rate distribution, loans likely made to the least risky borrowers. Higher percentiles of
the interest rate distribution are, however, affected by cramdown rulings, with the 60th through
90th percentiles seeing interest rate increases of 21-35 basis points. This is consistent with the
prediction that bankruptcy regulations affect credit markets for those most at risk of defaulting on
loan obligations.
Because cramdown only affects those who ﬁle for bankruptcy under Chapter 13, theory also
predicts that cramdown permissibility should have a larger impact in states where Chapter 13
is more commonly used. In panel (B) of Table 3, we interact cramdown permissibility with a
demeaned measure of the Chapter 13 ﬁling rate per thousand residents in 1987, prior to these
rulings. The empirical results are consistent with the theoretical prediction. The coefﬁcients on
the interaction term are noisy zeroes for the least risky loans but become consistently positive and
signiﬁcant for loans at and above the 70th percentile of the distribution. This implies that, for
the riskiest borrowers, cramdown permissibility raises interest rates more in states with higher
Chapter 13 ﬁling rates. Taken together, these two panels show consistent evidence that changes
in bankruptcy regulations have the largest impact on risky borrowers in jurisdictions where the
relevant form of bankruptcy is a likely outcome.
136 Discussion and Conclusion
Using state- and month-level variation in judicial rulings as a source of exogenous variation in
policy, we ﬁnd that giving judges the power to modify home loans through principal reductions
does, as theory predicts, raise the cost of credit. This provides some of the clearest evidence to
date of the impact of bankruptcy law on credit markets.
Our point estimates suggest that, during this time period, the permissibility of cramdown
raised interest rates on home loans by an average of 10-20 basis points, which translates into a 1-
2% increase in monthly payments. This relatively small impact may be explained by three factors.
First, if losses in foreclosure would be high, cramdown may have little ultimate effect on a lender’s
recovery. Second, Chapter 13 bankruptcy ﬁlings were relatively uncommon during the period in
question, peaking at 0.6% of all residential mortgages, so that Chapter 13 cramdown would have
been a comparatively rare occurrence.10 Third, the majority of Chapter 13 ﬁlings do not result in
a completed repayment plan, so that lenders often end up foreclosing on the properties anyway
(Porter 2011). Therefore, even if cramdown were legally possible, the result in most bankruptcy
cases would often be the same as would occur outside of bankruptcy, except to the extent that
judicial valuation varies from market valuation.
Extrapolating from our results to current policy may therefore be challenging. Whether cur-
rent attempts to legalize cramdown would result in similarly small impacts on interest rates de-
pends on how current conditions differ from those in the 1980s and 1990s. On the one hand, the
depressed macroeconomy drove the number of Chapter 13 ﬁlings in 2010 to nearly 440,000, 75%
higher than the 1992 peak cited previously, which suggests that cramdown might have even larger
impacts on lenders’ behavior than it did in the period we have studied. Moreover, were cram-
down available, Chapter 13 bankruptcy ﬁling would be more attractive to homeowners, which
could increase ﬁling rates. On the other hand, the depressed state of the housing market means
that foreclosure losses might also be quite high, so principal modiﬁcation might result in smaller
10During the period examined, annual Chapter 13 ﬁlings peaked at about 254,000 in 1992 (U.S. Courts Historical
Statistics). The Census’s 1993 American Housing Survey lists 37.2 million mortgaged properties (Table 3-15). Further-
more, not all such ﬁlings involved homeowners with mortgages, and only some home mortgagors ﬁling for Chapter 13
were both underwater and in judicial districts that permitted cramdown.
14losses to lenders if the modiﬁed loans perform.
The one clear ﬁnding of ours that would certainly translate to the current environment is the
heterogeneous impact of bankruptcy law generally and cramdown speciﬁcally on borrowers with
differing credit risks. Our results suggest strongly that cramdown has little impact on the credit
market for those at low risk ending up both underwater and in bankruptcy. The riskiest borrowers
bear the full cost of the change in legal regime. As such, legislation permitting principal modiﬁca-
tion by bankruptcy judges can be thought of as a form of insurance against foreclosure. Though
such insurance would be mandatory, in the sense that all borrowers are subject to the same legal
regime in bankruptcy, our evidence shows that only the riskiest borrowers would ultimately pay
for the privilege of such insurance. In this sense, cramdown may even be efﬁciency-enhancing by
creating a form of insurance that the private market does not provide.
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18Figure 2: Geography of Cramdown Rulings
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19Table 1: Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean St. dev. Minimum Maximum
(A) Cramdown
Months since January 1, 1987 65.17 35.23 1.00 120.00
Cramdown allowed 0.19 0.36 0.00 1.00
Allowed by circuit court 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00
Allowed by lower court 0.06 0.18 0.00 1.00
Chapter 13 ﬁling rate (1987) 0.50 0.39 0.01 2.76
(B) Loan quantity and price
Loan principal (’000s) 112.04 68.35 3.00 725.12
Loan-to-value 0.77 0.15 0.03 1.25
Effective interest rate 8.22 1.53 2.75 23.59
(C) Other loan characteristics
Term of loan (years) 27.77 6.37 1.00 50.00
Adjustable rate 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00
Savings banks 0.64 0.48 0.00 1.00
Mortgage company 0.27 0.45 0.00 1.00
Commerical bank 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00
FDIC thrift 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00
Notes: Sample size is 1,145,277 loans. Chapter 13 ﬁling rate measures ﬁlings per 1,000 residents in 1987 for each
state. Principal is measured in thousands of current dollars. The loan-to-value measures the ratio of principal to
home price. The effective interest rate is the stated interest rate plus the implied interest cost of any fees associated
with the loan. Savings banks refers to federal- and state-chartered savings banks and savings and loans associations
regulated by the Ofﬁce of Thrift Supervision.
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